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THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE FORECLOSURE
DOCTRINE
Wallace M. Rudolph*
The last four years have been busy years in shaping the future
of antitrust. Beginning with Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,1
the Supreme Court has continually followed a policy of denying
the right of viable companies to merge either vertically or hori-
zontally. In line with these decisions, the Court has been forced to
consider the effects of other forms of integration, such as exclusive
dealing, joint venture and franchise, that might accomplish the
same effect as the merger. On the other hand, the Court has been
required to recognize that some forms of integration are helpful
and useful to a competitive economy. Nevertheless, these cases
have developed into a pattern which may become an effective check
on both the growth of oligopoly and the exploitation of its po-
tential.
The Brown Shoe case itself is interesting in that it involves
one of the less concentrated industries in the United States.2 As
the Court pointed out, the top four companies after the Kinney
merger produced twenty-three per cent of the nation's shoes, while
the largest twenty-four manufacturers produced about thirty-five
per cent of the nation's shoes.3 The Court did not hold that the
merger of the manufacturing facilities was illegal. It held that the
vertical merger of a large retailer with an integrated manufacturer
and retailer is illegal. The Court carefully pointed out that the
Clayton Act was directed only at members of an oligopoly when it
said: "Similarly, Congress foresaw that the merger of two large
companies or a large and a small company might violate the Clayton
Act while the merger of two small companies might not, although
the share of the market foreclosed be identical, if the purpose of
the small companies is to enable them in combination to compete
with larger corporations dominating the market."4
The basis of this whole opinion lies in its attack on incipiency
and market trends and not in the least on existing market power.
* B.A., 1950, University of Chicago; J.D., 1953, University of Chicago.
Member of the Nebraska, Illinois, and American Bar Association. In-
structor, University of Chicago College of Law, 1957-58. Professor of
Law, University of Nebraska.
370 U.S. 294 (1962).
2 J. BAnr, BAmuxms T o NEW CoiwrnroN, 45 (1956).
8 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 300 (1962).
4 Id. at 331.
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Under no stretch of the imagination could one conceive that after
the merger Brown Shoe could, on its own, affect either the total
production of shoes or the general price level of shoes. Why then
did the Court act? Is there any justification for stopping a trend
in its incipiency when it may die before it has had an appreciable
market effect?
In the following statement, the Court seems to say that the
purpose is to protect the small businessman:
Of course, some of the results of large integrated or chain opera-
tions are beneficial to consumers. Their expansion is not rendered
unlawful by the mere fact that small independent stores may be
adversely affected. It is competition, not competitors, which the
Act protects. But we cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to
promote competition through the protection of viable, small, locally
owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional higher
costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented
industries and markets. It resolved these competing considerations
in favor of decentralization. We must give effect to that decision.5
This desire to protect small retailers is of small import to the
Court and in fact such protection probably could not and would
not be accomplished by the decision in Brown Shoe. The decision
basically stops the purchase of chains of retailers by manufacturers
and is aimed at foreclosure of the manufacturers' market. Thus if
the decision in the case grants any benefit, the benefit will go to
the other manufacturers and not to the small retailer.
Before we can tell if the Court's decision has any merit, we
must decide what, for the members of the industry, are the ad-
vantages that lie in the direction that the Brown Shoe Company
was moving. If the only advantages were those mentioned in the
opinion, e.g., "The retail outlets of integrated companies, by elimi-
nating wholesalers and by increasing the volume of purchases from
the manufacturing division of the enterprise, can market their own
brands at price below those of competing independent retailers,"'6
then there would be no reason for preventing the public from re-
ceiving the advantages of such a distribution system. The benefit
to Brown Shoe and other integrated manufacturers, however, must
lie in another area, or the opinion which prevents the integration is
wrong. What benefit is there to a shoe manufacturer to integrate
vertically? If no one else does so, and if the manufacturer has a
small percentage of the market, then the only advantages are those
which involve possible savings in handling. Such savings are un-
likely, however, because shoe jobbing is competitive and, therefore,
5 Id. at 344.
6 Id.
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there would be no monopoly or oligopoly profits to cut into. The
advantages must lie elsewhere.
Let us assume that the trend stopped or slowed by the Brown
Shoe decision had continued. Assume further that the major shoe
manufacturers had vertically integrated and that they had captured
a somewhat larger proportion of the market. What would be the
result? The vertical integration would permit extensive use of
both local and national advertising of shoes.7 Through advertising,
the major companies could begin, in the mind of the consumer, to
differentiate their shoes from other shoes. The manufacturers
could then receive whatever profits would arise from that differ-
entiation. In addition, through vertical integration there would
be very little leakage from the advertising.8 If a consumer goes
to a shoe store that sells a full line of shoes, he can easily be per-
suaded by the salesman to buy any brand. On the other hand, if
he goes to a vertically integrated shoe store, he has to buy the
brand of shoe sold there. Locally, the vertically integrated shoe
store can by its very presence be used to reinforce the national ad-
vertising. What, then, is wrong with this development if a reason-
able number of manufacturers still exist and compete under this
system? To fully answer this question, we must consider the full
results of this trend against the present organization of the indus-
try and determine whether such a system would be beneficial or
detrimental to the consumers of the society in general.
If national advertising, coupled with vertical integration, is a
successful business practice, then the capital requirements for a
firm to stay or to enter the shoe industry are increased enormously.
Clearly, an industry organized in such a fashion could not support
a great number of firms, since such advertising and vertical inte-
gration would become too costly unless they were spread over a
large volume. During the period of transition from competitive
to oligopolistic structure, the advantages would lie with the firms
in the best capital position and the ones who had already begun to
integrate. One might ask why firms would decide to engage in
vertical integration and national advertising if there were added
costs. First, if the firm were successful in differentiating its prod-
uct, the final result would allow the firm long-term oligopoly prof-
its and, secondly, the very fact that it could successfully raise the
scale of operations would increase the stability of its oligopoly
gains. The better capitalized firms have everything to gain by the
7 Bork, The Rule of Reason: Ancillary Restraints and the Per Se Rule,
75 YALE L. J. 373, 429, 451 (1966). Here, Bork discusses the advantages
of vertical integration in fostering a selling effort.
8 Id.
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switch to vertical integration and national advertising. As the cost
of competing for a share of the market rises, only firms that can
operate on a national scale and have assured outlets can spread the
cost of advertising over enough units.9 Thus, if the trend persists,
more and more retail chains and manufacturers will be required to
merge, to compete, or to sell out in order to limit their losses.
When the industry is reduced to the normal oligopoly form with
three or four firms holding seventy-five per cent of the market, a
new stability will arrive. Some small firms will remain because
they satisfy specialized segments of the market. The general price
of the product will be higher than before, first, because of the cost
of product differentiation, and secondly, because entry on the ap-
propriate scale would cost the entering firm more than it could
eventually recover. The reasons that the new firm could not re-
cover its cost are as follows: (1) the new firm must raise money
for plant, equipment, and for vertically integrated stores; (2) the
new firm must acquire enough volume to pay for national adver-
tising; (3) the new firm must advertise sufficiently so that con-
sumers will leave known brands and switch to his brand;' (4)
the new firm probably will not use price cutting because a new
firm would easily be matched by existing firms, and when so
matched, price-cutting would not increase the new firm's volume
but would reduce its revenue.'
9 Most advertising must be on a large scale. If you wish to advertise in
a national magazine or on national television you must buy an audience
of 4 or 40 million, as the case may be. You cannot buy smaller audi-
ences to fit smaller production, and therefore you must be able to
produce a large amount of goods to use these media.
10 J. BAn, supra note 2, at 116. "Thus a general tendency of buyers to
prefer the established firms. Thus a general tendency of buyers to
prefer established to new products may place potential entrants to a
differentiated-product industry at a disadvantage as compared to firms
already established in the industry." Id.
11 M. SHUBIK, STRATEGY AND MIUMET STRucTURE, 251-52 (1959).
"In a market in which there is a combination of some or all of these
features, few competitors, high overhead costs, high entry costs, limited
flexibility of short-run production rates (possibly job shop production),
high inventory charges, relatively inelastic demand for the products of
the firms as a group, relatively high cross-elasticity of demand between
similar products of different firms, open information on prices, tech-
nical difficulties in spreading information about frequent price changes
(catalogues for instance), or consumer resistance to recurrent price
adjustments, it is plausible to expect that any perceptible price cut by
one firm will at least be met by its competitors. If it is more profitable
for a firm to meet an opponent's price reduction than to maintain a
higher price, the reduction will at least be met. In general, with the
foregoing qualifications as to the type of market, this will hold true.
If we consider price competition, then ceteris paribus almost any
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Under such circumstances a new firm would expect to suffer
losses for a number of years before becoming established. What-
ever the initial investment, no return could be expected for some
time. Thus, if interest rates were six per cent and losses were ex-
pected for four years, the return after successful entry would have
to be exceedingly high in order to elicit investment of present
capital in expectation of income that would begin four years later. 2
price that is not too high to cause new entry will be a potential equilib-
rium price. The mere threat of each firm to meet a price cut is
sufficient. A plausible threat strategy that we may assume would be
employed by each firm can be expressed as follows:
I will maintain the statutory price if I observe that my opponent
has done so; if he cuts price, I will meet the cut; if he raises price, ten,
depending upon my analysis of market cross-elasticities, I may follow him.
The only violation short of total war that should be attempted
against such a strategy is an upward testing of the market.
Ceteris paribus (i.e., leaving out advertising, plant expansion,
styling, etc.), aluminum, steel, automobiles, rayon, and other heavy
manufacturing fit closely into this pattern of price competition. We
see that in markets of this structure we may expect similar prices and
even upward movements without there being any explicit communica-
tion between firms or any collusive intent. It is almost meaningless
to talk about collusive price behavior in such a market because the
structure implies that almost any price level within a range can be
enforced as a non-co-operative equilibrium under very plausible as-
sumptions concerning an opponent's threat." Id.
12 L SHUBir, supra note 2, at 260-64.
"The model to be examined is a very simplified one-person game
of economic survival applied to a problem of entry and investment.
We describe the game with the following notation:
X, 0, 0, op, A,,(-1 _1),Lb, 1 -).
The X is the amount of money in the firm's investment account, the
first 0 indicates that there is no money in the corporate account. The
0 and the oo are used to indicate that the player's opponent is nature,
who has 0 in her investment account and infinite resources in her cor-
porate account. The A, indicates the prize to the player if he loses (he
never wins in the sense that he remains the only survivor because he
can never ruin nature).
The market matrix and the strategy of nature are given. With all
this information, the problem that remains is more closely related to
probability theory than to game theory. However, it is a degenerate
form of game that is of economic interest.
As before, p is the discount rate. Furthermore, we assume that if
the firm enters the market, it will be forced out if its corporate account
reaches the size K where K < X. If a firm is ruined or otherwise li-
quidates, the "prize" A, = -K; in other words, if a firm leaves the
market, its liquidation losses are K (in the simplest example we assume
K = 0).
Suppose that a group of individuals with resources X wished to en-
ter the market with the object of maximizing the size of the expected
discounted income paid into the withdrawal account of their firm.
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We can see immediately that they will not enter if p = q = . We
assume that p > Y. It is also evident that there will be no incentive to
enter if the discount rate is greater than the expected gain in a single
period. For instance, if the expected gain from the investment of a
unit is 0.05 in one period and the discount rate is greater than 0.05,
there is no incentive to invest. Let v (X) represent the expected value
of entering into the market with initial assets of X. Suppose that the
group adopted the following financial strategy: If it entered the
market, then it would plow back all earnings into the firm until a
certain safety level Z had been established. Any amount above Z
would be paid out in dividends. The proof that this is the optimal
policy for the firm is given elsewhere. The group wished to deter-
mine the optimal value for the number Z and then to determine the
value of entering v (X) if they adopted their optimal financial policy.
We can portray the problem by this set of equations:
(1) v(X) = pv(X + 1) + pqv(X - 1) for X < Z
(2) v(0) - 0
(3) v(Z+ 1) =v(Z) + I
Equation 1 establishes a relation between the value of the position of
the firm at a given time t and the discounted value of the firm one pe-
riod later if it enters the market. It states that the value of the firm
at time t equals the expected discounted value of the firm in one period
later, after it has made a profit, plus the expected discounted value of
the firm after it has made a loss. Equation 2 states that the value of
the firm when it has no assets is zero (this is a special case in which K
= 0). Equation 3 specifies the boundary condition at which the firm
begins to pay dividends. The value of the firm, when it is operating
under the rule that it pays dividends if it makes a profit, equals the
expected discounted value of the firm with less assets caused by taking
a loss, plus the expected discounted value of the firm with the same
assets as previously, plus the expected discounted value of the divi-
dends.
In order to solve the difference equation 1 we set
v (X) = ax.
Equation 1 becomes
ppax+l - ax + pqax-1 = 0,
hence ppa 2 - a + pq = 0,
1 + V 1 - 4p2pq.
and a = 2p
denoting the roots by a, and a2,
v(X) = Alaix + A 2a2X.
From (2) and (3) we obtain
A1 = - A 2
and 1
A1 = (aiz+l - a 2z+l) - (alz - a2z)
The value of the investment to the firm is a function of both X and Z,
so we can express it as
(4) v (X, Z) = A 1 (Z) ajx - ax.
If we restrict payments to integral quantities, then we can calculate
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(X, Z) for different assets, policies, and probabilities directly by ma-
chine using equation 4.
Table 16
p = 0.7, p=0.99 p = 0.995, p =0.99
1, 2 3 X Z 2 3 4
1 j.26 1.59 1.10 1 191.34 195.08 195.08
2 2.29 1.60 2 194.21 198.02 198.02
3 2.29 3 199.04 1
p = 0.99, p = 0.55 p = 0.995, p = 0.55
X 7 8 Z 7 8 9 10
1 1.95 1.93 1 2.66 2.84 2.97 3.06
2 3.57 3.55 2 4.86 5.18 5.42 5.59
3 4.97 4.94 3 6.71 7.1g 7.48 7.71
4 6.20 6.16 4 8.82 8.83 9.24 9.52
5 7.33 7.27 5 9.65 10.28 10.75 11.09
6 8.38 8.32 6 10.85 11.57 12.10 12.47
7 . 9.32 7 11.94 12.73 13.32 13.728 10.31 8 13.80 14.43 14.87
9 9 15.48 15.95
10 10 169
Several values are given in Table 16:
The numbers in boxes represent the values of the largest invest-
ment that will be made under the appropriate optimal policy. We note
that in each case the incremental value of an extra unit invested drops
until it yields a return of less than a unit. The optimal amount called
for by the optimal policy is determined by the point at which the in-
crement of capital added has the same value as its cost. For example,
we note that when p = 0.995 and p = 0.99, under the policy Z = 3, the
value added by increasing investment from X = 2 to X = 3 is 194.99 -
193.99 = 1.
In general, the optimum policies call for small values for Z. Only
if there is a very low discount rate and a small favorable bias in the
odds, will Z become large.
The withdrawal policy depends upon the discount rate, the proba-
bility of success, and the size of the liquidation loss. In the example
calculated we simplified the calculations by assuming that there was
no liquidation loss. Thus we used equation 2, v (0) = 0. If we wish
to examine how the size of liquidation losses effect the solution we
must solve the system using equation:(2') v(K 2 = 0.
This indicates that as soon as the firm's assets fall to K it is ruined
and loses these assets. When there is no liquidation loss and the proba-
bility of gain is greater than the discount factor it will always pay a
firm interested in maximizing expected discounted income to enter
the market. This will not be true when there is a liquidation cost.
The analysis used was based on the assumption that the firm
wished to maximize the expected discounted value of funds withdrawn
from the corporation. Suppose, instead, that the investing firm were
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And clearly, the investor could not know whether he would ever
successfully enter. If the existing firms were strong, they would
consider whether to cut prices, increase advertising, etc., to stop
the entry. If they believed that within a reasonable time they
could stop the entry successfully, then it would be to their advan-
tage to do so.13 If on the other hand the new entrant could show
that nothing would daunt him, it is probable that the existing
firms would react only to aggressive moves by the entrant.' 4 Un-
der such circumstances, however, it is unlikely that a new entrant
would raise the capital to make an entry, for the amount of capital
necessary to do so would in most cases be either greater than the
amount necessary to buy out an existing competitor or to obtain
an equal return in another field.
a corporation controlled by officers whose fortunes are linked to the
assets as well as the earnings of their corporation. If they are forced
to pay out to the stockholders at least as much as q/p of any unit
earned, there will be no incentive for the directors to invest because
it is certain that eventually the investment will be lost and the total
assets of the corporation diminished, even though the stockholders may
have benefited.
The type of problem posed by a one-person game of economic sur-
vival is closely related to problems in dynamic programming and in-
ventory theory and involves the study of the theory of random walks
(footnotes omitted)." Id.
13 M. Sn us, supra note 2, at 264.
"The formula in equation 4 depends upon four financial features:
the rate of discount, the liquidation conditions for the firm, the size of
the initial investment funds available, and the disbursement policy
adopted by the entrant.
We note that as the initial assets of the entering firm are raised,
i.e., X becomes larger, the value of entering becomes greater. In other
words, the value of a firm is a function of the amount of money pos-
sessed by the individuals who buy it. The meaning of this becomes
more evident when we examine entry into an oligopolistic market.
Suppose an individual were offered an industrial plant for a sum that
tied up almost all the money that his financial group could obtain
credit lines for. Given a weak capitalization the other firms might
be able to wipe out the entrant within a brief period and more than
recoup their battle losses as compared with the loss they would other-
wise suffer through sharing the market. In this case the firm is not
worth its price to the prospective purchaser. Suppose now that the
price of the firm were still the same but that the purchasing group
controlled larger resources than before. The time it would take the
others to drive the entrant out and the losses incurred in doing so
might make it more economical to allow the newcomer to take a share
of the market without resorting to destructive tactics. The mere
presence of the entrant's extra reserves could be sufficient to change
a poor buy into a worthwhile investment." Id.
14 Id.
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Another circumstance exists to prevent entry. Assume that
the volume of the market cannot support more than four firms
which are vertically integrated and which use national advertis-
ing. In such a situation the new firm must expect that its entry
will be strongly resisted. Under such circumstances new investors
who lack "sunk costs" would be foolish to try to enter, even though
the return for the existing firms is greater than the general level
of return for investments.
We have stated that the cost of entry under such circum-
stances is much greater than the cost of buying an existing firm
and, therefore, no entry should be expected. One could assume
that if this were true, then the purchase price of an existing firm
would rise until the price was equal to the cost of a new entry.
This is not true, for a new entry into an oligopolistically organized
industry which has product differentiation may impose losses or
smaller profits on all parties. Such losses do not occur if entry is
by merger or purchase. No loss occurs during the time the product
is established. And there is no general loss to the whole industry
because existing firms do not have to adjust their prices and pro-
duction to accomodate the new firm. When entry is by merger
there is little possibility of a loss caused by overproduction. On the
other hand, a new entrant might force the whole industry into
producing more goods and thereby driving the price below the in-
dustry's marginal revenue. Such an occurrence is a distinct pos-
sibility, if we assume that prior to the entry of a new firm the ex-
isting firms had adjusted their production so that price equalled
marginal revenue. Under such circumstances it is clear that the
cost of a new large-scale entry could not be computed. 15 The price
of existing firms can, however, be calculated by discounting their
future income stream at an appropriate rate of interest.16 In a
competitive market, on the other hand, the price of an existing
firm would not be greater than the cost of its replacement. There-
fore, capital would move into the industry whenever the return
for the industry increased over the normal rate of return for capital,
and it would continue to move into the industry until the rate of
return in the industry equalled the rate of return available in
other industries.
Assuming that the shoe industry is now a competitive indus-
15 See generally M. Shubik, supra n6te 2, at ch. 10. Shubik points out
that numerous strategies are available to the existing firms depending
on their judgment of the vulnerability of the new entrants to attach
and the cost to the industry in engaging in these strategies.
16 Seligman, Why the Stock Market Acts that Way, FORTUNE, Nov. 1966,
at 154.
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try, we find that when the demand for shoes shifts so that the
existing firms make a greater than normal return, there is an im-
mediate influx of capital into the industry. The costs in the new
firms would be no greater than in the existing firms. Conversely,
if we assume that the shoe industry is organized oligopolistically
and entry into the industry is made only on a scale that would
justify national advertising and vertical integration, then no entry
could be made unless the shift in the demand for shoes were so
great that the entry could be made on that scale without disrupt-
ing the existing firms. Certainly the conditions for successful
entry in a oligopolistically organized industry would not exist
merely because the rate of return in the industry was greater than
the rate generally available or because the price of the product was
above its marginal cost. The conditions for entry require an un-
usual demand situation wherein the existing firms cannot meet
that unusual demand even though the consumers wish to patronize
the existing firms. Under such circumstances, existing firms could
not retaliate against a new entrant. Conditions of this sort existed
in the auto industry for a short time immediately after World War
II. Under those conditions Kaiser Motors was able to enter the
market. But when normal consumer preferences could operate,
then the new firm was unable to stay in business.
If it is true that vertical integration together with national ad-
vertising leading to market differentiation of the product is an ef-
fective barrier to entry and results in an oligopolistic organization
of industry, does it follow that such an organization of industry
should be deterred or prevented by law?
One may argue that industry is organized in this fashion be-
cause consumers want it that way. The logic of the argument is
that if consumers prefer lower prices to national advertising, ver-
tical integration, and product differentiation, they would buy from
companies that produce lower priced goods as opposed to nationally
advertised goods. Thus one admits that if it is impossible to sell
both nationally advertised and lower-priced goods simultaneously,
then industry will produce what the majority of the consumers
"prefer." But if the consumer prefers higher prices and product
differentiation, he should be allowed to have it.17 The validity of
17 Bork, supra note 7, at 473.
"The contention that consumers rather than producers should de-
termine whether lower prices or other inducements are offered con-
stitutes a fundamental misperception of the issue. In the case of all
ancillary restraints whose legality is proposed here, consumers do make
that determination. The decision whether to employ increased sales
effort, offer more post-sale service, and so forth, is the same as the
decision whether to incur any other costs. The company or group of
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this contention may be tested by the public's recent experience
with trading stamps. Certainly for a time it was good business to
add trading stamps as an incentive to volume. After a time, how-
ever, when all parties had added trading stamps, their addition
only increased prices. This is an example of the consequences of
following consumer preferences. The food industry was saddled
with an added cost which neither the sellers nor the buyers wanted.
Luckily the addition of trading stamps did not change the basic
structure of the retail distribution system, and when it became
clear that the stamps were losing effectiveness, they could be
dropped. This could not be done, however, if instead of trading
stamps, vertical integration, national advertising, and product dif-
ferentiation were used to increase market shares. After such a
market had been restructured, it is unlikely that it could be turned
into a competitive industry again. Moreover, to argue in support
of consumer preferences is to ignore the fact that sellers have a
basic interest in fostering such preferences. Sellers do not merely
react to what the consumers want, they create wants in the con-
sumers that will benefit the sellers. Thus, if an oligopolistic or-
ganization of industry is beneficial to sellers and detrimental to
consumers, but can be brought about and protected by vertical in-
tegration, national advertising, and product differentiation, then
oligopolistic industry can hardly be called consumer preference,
for the industry is able to persuade the individual consumer of the
mythical superiority of his product.
cooperating companies will attempt to combine expenditures on sup-
plies, machinery, labor, management, advertising, servicing, etc., to
arrive at a final package at a price which will prove most profitable.
Profitability depends upon favorable consumer response. In a hori-
zontal case, where a group lawfully employing an ancillary restraint
is necessarily faced by competitors, the preference of any significant
number of consumers for lower prices instead of sales effort or post-
sale service, for example, will evoke a response from some producers.
In a vertical case the same thing will occur. Where the manufacturer
is a monopolist in a vertical case, it may offer different lines of pro-
ducts to attempt most effectively to comply with the preferences of
different segments of the market. One line might rely upon heavy
sales effort while another might have primarily a price appeal. Where
such diversity is not feasible the preference of the majority of con-
sumers will control. In each of the instances where the legality of
an ancillary restraint is proposed, consumer choice is as effective as
it would be in the corresponding ownership integration situations.
Indeed, where contract integration is involved, an ancillary restraint
will often be essential to give consumers a choice. But for the re-
straint, the free ride and other problems discussed would prevent the
contract-integrated system from offering the level of sales effort, serv-
icing and other activities which consumers might prefer (footnotes
omitted)." Id.
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To argue this is to deny that society as a whole has any
choices, for if the individual consumer decides to pay for product
differentiation, his choice is supreme, even if as a member of a
group he should decide, after study and deliberation, that such ac-
tivity is useless and raises costs for him without a corresponding
benefit. Such a result cannot be the intent of the antitrust law.
Instead, the logic of this argument reflects the belief that the mar-
ket is made up completely of informed and fully rational people. If
we reject this version of consumer choice as the only guide to eco-
nomic policy, then we must consider what other methods of or-
ganizing industry are available to us.
It is clear that oligopolistically organized industries have some
definite advantages for members of industry and some disadvan-
tages for the public. First, an oligopolist will not cut prices even
when such prices are above cost, for if he has at least twenty per
cent of a market and if he decides to cut prices, his fellow oligopo-
lists will cut prices, too. Under such circumstances it is unlikely
that anyone will gain in market penetration. Thus our first oligop-
olists, all things remaining equal, would by such a cut only lose
revenue. This does not mean that prices always remain the same.
If demands shift so that the total revenue of the industry would be
higher if prices were cut, then the industry may as a body reduce
prices.' 8 In any case, the price relationship between the oligop-
olists will remain unchanged. Again, this does not mean that all
prices charged by all the oligopolists are the same. Each oligopolist
differentiates his product by any means at his disposal. Thus,
each product would have its own demand curve which would relate
directly to the demand curves of the other oligopolists. Under
such circumstances it would not be unusual to see essentially
equal products sold at slightly different prices. The desire to prod-
uct differentiate is the key motivation to oligopolists selling to con-
sumers. Each expenditure in this area, if successful, allows each
seller to differentiate his product so that in a sense his product
becomes unique. That same expenditure may also shift the ag-
gregate demand for the product. The ultimate success of product
differentiation makes the oligopolist the only seller of a "particular"
desirable product.
Thus, dollars spent for product differentiation have a dual func-
tion. First, such expenditures permit the oligopolist a greater mar-
18 An example of this shift in demand is the air travel industry. Lower
prices have brought greater total revenue. We must assume that prior
pricing was correct in maximizing revenue but with the improvement
of the product, the decline of the railroads and the increase of dis-
cretionary income the demand for air travel increased.
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ket penetration and more freedom in pricing. At the same time,
these expenditures shift the total demand for the goods toward his
industry. Moreover, as products are differentiated, the cost of en-
try is increased, for the cost now includes dissuading the consumer
from adhering to his existing preference.
Under the conditions of oligopoly, then, we can expect large
expenditures for product differentiation for the purpose of (1) shift-
ing demand toward the product generally, (2) for the purpose of
product differentiation and shifting the existing demand among
the various oligopolists, and (3) for the purpose of increasing the
costs of entry through the establishment of brand preferences.
None of the purposes listed, with the possible exception of shifting
total demand, grants any benefit to the consumer. As far as the
public is concerned, such expenditures are a complete waste of re-
sources. These expenditures do, however, benefit the oligopolists
and the persons actually producing the product differentiation.
Even the first purpose-shifting total demand-is a waste unless it
is necessary to increase demand to a level required for efficient
production or unless the product in some way increases the produc-
tivity of the individual using it, e.g., advertising to convince people
to use better methods for the protection of their health, education,
or training.
Thus we can see that none of the usual benefits of price compe-
tition occur and that instead of a proper allocation of resources,
we have a misallocation. We can therefore assume that if the only
purpose of a merger is to enable the merging firms to be better able
to compete as oligopolies, then the courts ought not to approve
such a merger. For if the purpose of the merger is to help firms
product differentiate more easily in local markets though vertical
integration, or more easily to product differentiate by advertising
in the national market, then the courts should not, and usually do
not, approve a merger. On the other hand, if a merger will pro-
duce physical efficiency either in scale or in the distribution of the
product, or if the merger will prevent one of the firms from leaving
the market, then the merger will be approved.
Thus the Brown Shoe case holds that vertical mergers will not
be approved, if the major purpose of the merger is to establish
oligopolistic competition by raising the scale of entry to so great a
magnitude that only national concerns with national advertising
can exist. Moreover, this case holds that any viable industry will
not be allowed to reorganize itself by merger if the efficiencies to
be gained by such a merger do not relate to physical efficiencies
but rather to gains, through scale advertising and through raising
the cost of entry for possible competitors. Such gains may be
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useful to an individual firm, but they are not in any way useful
to society in general.
On the other hand, if vertical integration coupled with na-
tional advertising is desired by individual consumers and if it is
profitable to firms, would not the Court's refusal to permit vertical
integration by merger be useless insofar as firms would integrate
vertically even without mergers? Certainly it would be useless, if
the only saving in a merger were the cost of training personnel
and investing capital.
An additional restriction to vertical integration, however, does
exist in that the market cannot support a substantial increase in
competitive facilities. Assume, for example, that the retail selling
of shoes is competitive. Assume further that entry is easy and
hence enough, if not more than enough, retail stores exist. Under
such circumstances, if Brown Shoe, for example, wishes to open up
a substantial number of shoe stores, such stores could operate only
at a loss, at least until a significant number of other stores went
out of business. This loss to Brown Shoe and to other members of
the retail trade, makes it cheaper for Brown Shoe to integrate
vertically by merger than for Brown Shoe to open its own stores.19
19 M. SHUBIK, STRATEGY AND MARKET STRUCTURE 132-34 (1959).
"Up to this point we have avoided discussing the possibility that
a multiplicity of pure strategy equilibrium points and mixed strategy
equilibria exist in a Cournot game. Actually, the market described in
subsection 2.3 is of this type. The equilibrium with the eleven most
efficient firms producing is only one of the many equilibria possible.
In general, in an n-person symmetric Cournot game, if only k firms
can produce at a profit greater than or equal to zero, there will be
n!/[k!(n-k)!] pure strategy equilibrium points at which k firms
produce and n-k firms are only in being. Even if there are cost
differences, there may be equilibria with different and not necessarily
the most efficient firms in production. Suppose that in the example
given in subsection 2.3 the eleven firms in production were not the
eleven most efficient but consisted of the ten most efficient and the
twelfth most efficient. This would give an equilibrium position, for
if the eleventh most efficient firm (now only a firm-in-being) came
into active production there would be twelve firms in the market and
all would suffer losses. Hence, given that there are already eleven
in active production, it is not motivated to enter. (This holds true for
any eleven firms out of the first 106 most efficient; the number 106
is obtained by observing that, as fixed costs are rising by 0.001, if
player eleven makes a profit of 0.095 with eleven active players in
the market then player number 106 would make a profit of zero.)
This result implies that under oligopolistic competition the equilib-
rium distribution of resources may depend upon the order of entry
of firms as well as upon their relative efficiencies (even without
considering asset problems.) A simple example which illustrates this
point is the entry of a new gas station into an area which already has
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several stations. The new plant may be inherently more efficient than
several in active production, but the potential entrant may not enter
because the profit to all will become negative. A full treatment re-
quires a dynamic model with ruin possibilities introduced explicitly.
These comments also hold for price games.
This equilibrium state with "misallocation of resources" does not
take place under the competitive assumptions because the individual
entrepreneur uses only the existing market price as his entry criterion,
in which case firms may enter, depress the market price, cause losses
to many (possibly including themselves), and eventually drive out
other firms before establishing equilibrium.
Quantity variation markets may have mixed strategy equilibrium
points. Once again we stress that it is hard to give an economic
interpretation of such an equilibrium because of the restrictions on
the model. The ruling out of costs of entry and exit and asset and
other dynamic considerations rids us of much that is important to
oligopoly theory. However, in some cases an interpretation in terms
of overcapacity can be given.
We may view a mixed strategy equilibrium as a fight carried on
by a group of firms which is too large to have all members make a
profit simultaneously. In any dynamic model this state will not be
stable, for eventually some firms will be driven out of competition.
An example of such a game is given here.
Consider two firms with average cost functions 'yi = 10 - 2.5qj +
q12and ademandfunctionp = 10-2 q, for i= 1, 2. When we
solve the equation system bPi/bqi = 0 in which P, is the profit of
player i we obtain qj(3q1 + 1) - 0, if we assume that there is a
symmetric equilibrium; negative q 's are inadmissible, and q, = Q =
0 is not an equilibrium point. This indicates that there is no pure
strategy symmetric equilibrium point.
There may be a mixed strategy equilibrium. A result obtained by
Karlin9 shows that a mixed strategy in a game of this form involves
only two pure strategies. In general, to solve such a game we have
H2 (q2 ) = aq2[j Xq1 ) -72(q2) I + (1 - a,) q2 [q5(Zqi) -- 72(q2) I.
H 2 (q2) is the expected payoff of the second player and ai and 1 - a,
represent the probabilities played by the first player we have the con-
ditions
bH
H(q 2) = 0,10 -= 0, ql = q2.
bq2
In the foregoing example we obtain ai = ,. Hence the producer pro-
duces / with probability 3 or stays out of the market with probability
7s. We check this by evaluating the mixed strategy which gives
I f.(1) (-7) (7) (1)]--0.
7 8 16 - -8 T6 "
The game has two nonsymmetric pure strategy equilibrium points
at q, = % and q2 = 0 or q, = 0 and q2 = :V, respectively (these are
obtained by solving the first set of equations without assuming that
q= q2 at equilibrium.)
The pure strategy equilibria have only one firm entering the mar-
ket, whereas the other remains as a firm-in-being. The mixed strategy
has both firms active in a market that is "too thin" for two producers
of the size (footnotes omitted)." Id.
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Even when the merger of Brown Shoe with Kinney was denied,
Brown Shoe did not attempt to open new stores. Instead it or-
ganized a franchise system to accomplish the vertical integration
which had been blocked by the Supreme Court's refusal to approve
its merger with Kinney.20 The franchise system also avoided new
unproductive investments in retail stores.
This analysis of the Brown Shoe case explains why firms use
both vertical and conglomerate mergers instead of establishing new
firms. Normally, no anti-competitive effect occurs in a conglomer-
ate merger, because separate markets exist for each product. Thus,
no difference should exist between a rich man entering an industry
by purchasing an existing competitior or a business firm doing so
through the use of its capital. In fact, barring firms in one in-
dustry from purchasing firms in other industries would cut off im-
portant sources of capital. We must not forget, however, that
section seven2 ' does not apply to new enterprises, and even the
complete elimination of conglomerate mergers would not prevent
business firms from entering any industry in which more than
normal profits were available.
Let us return to the merger situation. Again we must ex-
amine why firms merge instead of making new investments. As-
sume that the industry in which the merger takes place was al-
ready oligopolistic. When a firm buys into an industry, it does
not disrupt prices and it does not interrupt the existing oligopolis-
tic structure of the industry. On the other hand, starting a new
business would impose costs on the entrant and would also cause
the whole industry to operate at a price lower than the indus-
try's marginal revenue. For we must assume that prior to the
new entry, the firms had been operating so that price equalled
marginal revenue. A new entry would be more beneficial to the
public than an entry by merger in any industry which had greater
than competitive profits or less than optimum investment. Never-
theless, an entry by conglomerate merger into such an industry
does no harm and can only be thought of in the same manner as an
entry through purchase by anyone into that industry. On the
other hand, little societal benefit to a conglomerate merger exists
if, by definition, conglomerate involves merging firms which are in
different industries.22
In addition to the desire to purchase a firm in a profitable in-
dustry, conglomerate mergers occur for tax reasons, for empire
20 Id.
21 Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
22 Burck, The Perils of the Multi-Market Corporation, FORTUNE, Feb. 1966,
at 130.
THE FORECLOSURE DOCTRINE
building purposes, for the purpose of permitting existing personnel
to exercise greater management scope, for the purpose of pooling fi-
nancial resources, and for the purpose of fostering reciprocal buy-
ing. Mergers motivated by tax considerations must be dealt with
within tax laws, but the existence of tax advantages cannot be
taken to excuse possible anti-competitive mergers. Mergers moti-
vated by empire building or by a desire to use personnel may be
better studied by psychologists than by lawyers; yet, again, such
desires cannot be fulfilled at the expense of a competitive economy.
On the other hand, reciprocal trading and financial diversification
do have direct impact on the competitive market structure and
must be either accepted or rejected as a justification for merger.
Reciprocal trading would not be possible in an industry where con-
sumers are the purchasers. In non-consumer industries, the mem-
bers of the industry cannot product differentiate through sales ef-
fort and national advertising.
Is it possible that reciprocal trading may accomplish the same
objective in non-consumer industries as product differentiation ac-
complishes in consumer industries? Reciprocal trading may be able
to raise the cost of entry into the industry and so permit existing
firms some freedom from competitive pressures. The Court was
faced with this problem in FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp.23 Un-
der orthodox economic analysis, it would not pay Consolidated to
force its food processors to buy from its subsidiary, Gentry. It is
unlikely, however, that Consolidated would actually pay higher
prices when enforcing reciprocal trading. The orthodox argument
would assume that if the seller to Consolidated would purchase
from Gentry only under pressure, that pressure would be worth
something. Thus Consolidated could obtain a further price con-
cession instead of exercising this pressure, and since there is no
reason to have Gentry instead of Consolidated make profits, then
there would be no reason for Consolidated to exercise the pressure.
This argument also assumes that Consolidated is paying the lowest
possible price for goods that it buys, and, therefore, cannot exert
any pressure unless it pays a higher price for such goods.
Clearly, under realistic market conditions, this analysis breaks
down, for it is possible that Consolidated is not getting the lowest
price on its purchases. This may occur either because the sellers
are unable to cut prices to Consolidated under the anti-price dis-
criination provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act 24 or because
the sellers themselves are not competing in price. Under either cir-
cumstance, the seller would be more willing to agree to purchase
23 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
24 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964).
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from Gentry than to price discriminate in favor of Consolidated.
One could say that such practices as price discrimination in favor
of large customers are not necessarily bad even though they are
outlawed by the Robinson-Patman Act.25 Such practices have, how-
ever, the important side effect of limiting entry into the dehy-
drated onion and garlic market. Undoubtedly the dehydrated
onion and garlic market has an inelastic demand curve because
the price of onions and garlic would not substantially effect the
price of the food products using onions and garlic. We could con-
clude, therefore, that a lowered price for onions and garlic would
not substantially increase the use of onions and garlic. In such
markets, it is important to the sellers that prices are maintained,
since price cutting would not benefit anyone but the buyers. Un-
der such circumstances, the more barriers to entry, the better. En-
try would be deterred if the possible customers were already taken.
A new entrant could only cut prices to its own detriment, since
such price cuts would be met. Improving quality is the only pos-
sible competitive play. Such a play is not available, however, to
the new entrant, because he lacks experience. Accordingly, entry
would be forestalled. We can see, then, that conglomerate mergers
with reciprocal buying may be used whenever the major partner in
the merger is an oligopolistic buyer. The buyer may exert price
concessions through reciprocal buying when such price concessions
are either not forthcoming because of the oligopolistic nature of
the sellers or because of the Robinson-Patman Act. The evil of
such mergers does not lie in their cause, however. The evil lies
in discouraging entry into an industry.
The other major reason for conglomerate merger, the pooling of
financial resources, may have beneficial effects. This is especially
true when one of the firms is a failing firm. On the other hand,
if the purpose of the merger is to give a firm in a small industry
unlimited financial resources, such a merger may have unfortunate
market effects, for it is axiomatic that greater financial resources
are better than smaller financial resources. Let us then assume
an oligopolistic market with a small number of sellers. In such a
market, no seller will cut prices, since the price cut would be
matched, and the whole industry would receive less revenue. This
course of action would not hold true if the other firms could not
continuously match the price cut or could not match it over any
long period of time. Under such circumstances, the richest firm
could expand its share of the market either by price cuts or by
threats of price cuts. Other firms would be forced out of the indus-
try or would voluntarily concede some of their share of the mar-
25 IdC
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ket to the richest firm. Because of this possibility, the law should
take an interest when an industrial giant brings its financial re-
sources into play on a small industry. Where one firm by merger
with an industrial giant has financial resources infinitely greater
than all the other firms combined and more financial resources than
any firm in such an industry could be expected to attract, it would
be exceptional indeed if such a firm's market penetration did not
increase considerably.26 This, of course, happened in Reynolds
Metal Co. v. FTC.2 7 The court ordered Reynolds to divest itself of
the acquired company but not of the plant built for the acquired
company. In the florist foil market, which is the market in the Rey-
nold's case, one of the firms had substantially better financial posi-
tion than the other firms. Such a firm would never be threatened
with price cutting by other firms. The firm also could engage in
substantial price cutting knowing that the other firms would not be
able to retaliate effectively. Thus the merged firm, if not re-
strained by other considerations, could impose any conditions of
market division that it wished. What it would do, of course, would
depend upon what Reynolds hoped to impose as a long run equi-
librium. It might be that Reynolds' strategy was to obtain fifty
per cent of the market and then to maintain that percentage. At
that point, Reynolds could again raise prices and be assured that
because of its effective threat of retaliation, no one would attempt
to cut into its percentage. The court of appeals ordered Reynolds
to divest itself of Arrow.
Nevertheless, the court of appeals did not require Reynolds to
dispose of the plant it had built after the merger for Arrow. Thus
the court held true to its statement that it would not prevent an
industrial giant from entering by new investment an industry
populated by commercial pygmies. Such an entry by new invest-
ment, of course, is more expensive for the large firm and requires
that firm to spend a considerable amount of money before it can
achieve a dominant position. To prevent entry entirely would of
course cut off nearly all new competition from most industries and
leave existing competitors without any check In addition, the
court realized that no law now exists that can prevent entry by
new investment.
The other so-called conglomerate merger cases, such as Conti-
nental Can v. United States,28 are not in reality conglomerate
merger cases at all. In this situation, the Supreme Court recog-
26 M. SHuBIK, STRATEGY AND MARKET STRUCTURE ch. 10 (1959).
27 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
28 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
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nized that there is horizontal competition between glass and metal
container manufacturers, and, therefore, the Court applied its
rather stringent horizontal merger rules to such mergers.
The vertical integration and conglomerate merger cases are
based on the theory that the number of possible outlets for a prod-
uct is relatively fixed and that entry into any industry may be too
costly to be economically feasible. These cases, therefore, assume
that the number of existing outlets is relatively fixed and that
each outlet is a protected market. The Court does not consider
whether the protection for the market is great or small. But the
Court does recognize that within some range the ability to control
the buying habits of existing outlets is a valuable asset. The Court
also recognizes that the ability to exclude other firms from exist-
ing outlets will add costs to such firms.
If the rationale for the vertical and conglomerate merger de-
cisions is to prevent firms from foreclosing the existing market by
raising the scale of entry through vertical integration, outlet fore-
closure, and product differentiation, then such decisions would be
ineffective if other methods of accomplishing the same purpose
were permitted. In industries dealing with consumers, the same
effect as a vertical merger can be accomplished by exclusive fran-
chises. The development of such arrangements came about be-
cause of the need to combine national advertising with local sales
effort and, in some cases, post sales service.
If money is to be spent on advertising, the manufacturer wants
to be sure that the retailer does not shift the customer to another
product. He also wants to have his products advertised locally and
sold by a dealer that has a good reputation in the community. 29
Because the manufacturer believes that he must have an exclusive
outlet, he must produce enough volume so that the outlet operates
efficiently.
Thus the same problem arises in franchises as arises in vertical
integration. The scale of entry is raised to a level that will sup-
port only a limited number of companies. If each manufacturer is
to have exclusive outlets and the outlets are to be of efficient size
and density to give good customer service, then national advertis-
ing must insure that each outlet has enough business volume. It
is inconceivable that more than three or four heavy truck outlets
could be supported by small towns of 10,000 to 100,000 people. If
each outlet had to be exclusive, then the number of truck manu-
facturers would be restricted to four. Such a system makes entry
29 Bork, The Rule of Reason: Ancillary Restraints and the Per Se Rule,
75 YALE L. J. 373, 454-55 (1966).
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almost impossible, because the scale of entry would include a vol-
ume necessary to support exclusive outlets in every town in
America. Thus the franchise system itself has decreed that truck
manufacturing be oligopolistically organized. This same analysis
can be applied to most fields where the investment in an outlet is
substantial and the market will support only a limited number of
outlets.
Hence the other restrictions imposed in exclusive franchise ar-
rangements, such as exclusive territories, price fixing and customer
allocation, are secondary to the basic evil of exclusive outlet. All
other mechanisms make the outlet more secure and allow a greater
density of outlets. Once the use of exclusive outlets is accepted
as the main method of distributing a product, the other mechan-
isms probably can do no harm and, in fact, make may entry easier.
Let us assume that most of the products of an industry are dis-
tributed through exclusive outlets. A new entrant or a smaller
existing firm may want to compete through product differenti-
ation. Since the firm must compete through product differentiation
and local sales efforts in exclusive outlets, then the firm's only
choice is to persuade businessmen to invest in such an exclusive
outlet. The firm may be required to guarantee the businessmen
exclusive territory in order to persuade them to make the neces-
sary investment. Granting exclusive territories would be unnnec-
essary, of course, if the producer had a product that was already
accepted. Under such conditions, one would be glad to make the
necessary expenditure in order to get the franchise. In any case,
it would be unfortunate if smaller firms were denied the right to
make exclusive territorial franchise arrangements in any industry
where the dominant distribution system was through exclusive out-
lets.
The same reasoning that would permit smaller firms to have
exclusive territorial arrangements can also justify such arrange-
ments in new industries. If a new industry calls for the invest-
ment of capital and time, then exclusive territorial arrangements
with customer allocation may be permitted in order to draw the
necessary capital into a new enterprise. That the retail dealer can
demand to be the exclusive outlet in an area for a product does
not justify, however, the opposite restriction, i.e., that he, as a re-
tailer, deal only in such goods. Such restrictions are not valid and
will force the producer segment of an industry into an oligopoly.
The only excuse for such a restriction is to induce producers to in-
vest in the capitalization of the retail or service outlets in an untried
field. If such investment is necessary to insure that the field be
developed, and if the investment would not be forthcoming with-
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out such exclusive arrangements, then exclusive arrangements
might be allowed for a limited period of time.
The desire of the Court to foster new investment in gasoline
stations may have been the rationale behind FTC v. Sinclair Re-
fining Co.3 0 In that decision, the Court upheld a restriction that
gas pumps leased by Sinclair would be used only for the sale of
Sinclair gasoline. Of course, all of the major companies were do-
ing the same thing,3 ' and the result of the approval of these ex-
clusive arrangements is the oligopolistic marketing system we now
have in gasoline. In effect, the Court must decide whether the
loaning of capital vertically and the subsequent tie to the retail
outlet is justified by the need for capital in the field. In one
sense, this sort of ancillary restraint on the loan of capital cannot
be outlawed under the merger provisions of the Clayton Act, since
the tie involves a new investment. Notwithstanding the Sinclair
decision, such arrangements are again subject to attack under
section five of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The Supreme
Court in FTC v. Brown Shoe,3 2 upheld the determination of the
Federal Trade Commission that Brown's insistence that stores push
their shoes in return for services was an unfair business practice.
Certainly arrangements that provide such exclusive or preferential
outlets must be limited in time and be scrutinized carefully to in-
sure that these arrangements do not effectively impose an oligopo-
listic structure on the market.
The effects arising out of the development of exclusive outlets
still plague the courts. The latest problem is found in Atlantic
Ref. Co. v. FTC.33 In that case, Atlantic signed a contract with a
third party, Goodyear, to supply TBA (tires, batteries, and acces-
sories) to the dealers selling Atlantic's products. As compensa-
tion, Atlantic received seven and one-half per cent of gross sales.
This payment of compensation to Atlantic shows that an undis-
turbed access to a substantial market is economically beneficial.
Goodyear is basically paying for this undisturbed market. Under
standard economic analysis, Goodyear could not pay the additional
money to Atlantic and remain competitive with other firms in the
sale of tires to dealers. What, then, could explain the ability of
Goodyear to pay Atlantic? We must recognize that the sale of
TBA in gasoline stations is different from the sale of the same
items in a Western Auto and Tire Store, in Sears, or even in a
30 261 U.S. 463 (1923).
3' FTC v. Maloney Oil & Mfg. Co., 2 F.T.C. 346 (1920).
82 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
33 381 U.S. 357 (1965).
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Goodyear Store. A large number of service station sales are con-
venience sales, and, therefore, may be made at a higher price. We
also recognize that without the sale of the primary product, gaso-
line, these outlets could not economically exist. The question, then,
is who should receive the additional profit that may be obtained
from TBA products due to the convenient nature of the outlet?
The choice is between the supplier, Atlantic, and the station owner.
Atlantic can legitimately believe that the dealer would not have a
convenience customer without Atlantic's advertising and good will.
On the other hand, the dealer may believe that he is an independent
businessman who can build his own TBA business. The fact that
Atlantic may force its dealers to purchase products from Atlantic
may not concern us as much as the fact that the Atlantic contract
with Goodyear forecloses other TBA manufacturers from the con-
venience TBA market. We know that such contracts will cut off
such outlets from other TBA manufacturers. Thus the whole mar-
ket of convenience TBA will tend to be dominated by the major
gasoline distributing companies, either under the private label of
the major oil companies or by sales to the major oil companies'
dealers through exclusive sales arrangements, such as the Atlantic-
Goodyear contract. The result of this arrangement will force the
independent TBA manufacturers out of the convenience market.
Hence Justice Goldberg is basically correct when he notes that the
purchase resale plan carried on by major oil companies has the
same foreclosure effect as an exclusive sales agent plan. The only
advantage in the repurchase system over the exclusive sales con-
tract system is that smaller manufacturers may exist by selling
private labels to the major gasoline companies.
On the other side of the exclusive arrangement is the retailer
or agent who wishes to have an exclusive territory. He wishes, of
course, to avoid competition with other agents or retailers who sell
the manufacturer's goods. If the goods were being sold on the
basis of price competition alone, it would be against the manu-
facturer's interest to allow his agents freedom from competition.
The reason for this is obvious. Since there is one price which best
moves goods and maximizes revenue, then giving a higher price or
protecting the retailer margin would deprive the manufacturer of
some revenue. If, for example, he raised his own price to compen-
sate for the higher retail margin, the total revenue would be less,
and the manufacturer's total revenue would be even less.
How, then, do we explain the use of exclusive territorial ar-
rangements, resale price maintenance, and customer allocation? It
must be explained on the basis that the manufacturer wishes to
have his product differentiated by the agent or retailer. If the
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manufacturer pays the agent or retailer to make special efforts, the
agent or retailer may be able to convince his customers that the
manufacturer's product is different, better, and more easily ser-
viced than other products. If the agent or retailer is successful,
then the manufacturer's demand curve will have been modified and
the total receipts of the retailer and manufacturer will be greater
than they would have been without such efforts. This is not to
say that their total net receipts would be greater than in an in-
dustry where nothing was spent on local sales effort, but only that
the receipts are greater for them than their receipts would have
been if others were also making a special effort to sell.
The problem of inducements to make special local efforts was
presented to the Court in White Motor Co. v. United States.8 4 The
Court refused to rule on the transaction when Justice Douglas said:
We are asked to extend the holding in Timken Roller Bearing Co.
v. United States, supra (which banned horizontal arrangements
among competitors to divide territory), to a vertical arrangement
by one manufacturer restricting the territory of his distributors or
dealers. We intimate no view one way or the other on the legality
of such an arrangement, for we believe that the applicable rule of
law should be designed after a trial.
This is the first case involving a territorial restriction in a vertical
arrangement; and we know too little of the actual impact of both
that restriction and the one respecting customers to reach a con-
clusion on the bare bones of the documentary evidence before us.8 5
The Court was puzzled because the restrictions in question, except
for the reservation of customers by White, were for the benefit of
the dealers. The Court was faced by an industry which basically
sold trucks through exclusive outlets. If White was to compete in
this industry, it had to have a successful dealer organization that
would give adequate geographic coverage. It was possible that
White could acquire this coverage only by granting its dealers a
competition-free island, since dealers were required to make large
investments and deal solely in White trucks. And, outlawing the
arrangement in its entirety might destroy White. The Court did
not here discuss the real evil, which is the use of exclusive outlets.
If there were general outlets, no need would exist for any of the
restrictions, and White would not be forced to grant competition-
free islands to be sure that its product was sold and differentiated.
If any successful attack is to be made on the oligopolies in the
auto and truck business, it must be made on the exclusive distri-
bution systems themselves. Such an attack may have been made
34 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
35 Id.
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in United States v. General Motors Corp.3 6 In that case, the Court
held that General Motors, together with its dealers, could not boy-
cott discounters. That may have been the decision which will per-
mit the growth of multiple outlets and thus make product dif-
ferentiation more difficult in this field. Clearly, this case must
be contrasted with White Motors in that a stricter standard of con-
duct is expected of General Motors, which is a dominant firm in an
industry, than of White Motors, which is a smaller firm in that
industry. This is logical because the dominant firm does not need
to use exclusive outlets effectively to sell its products, and for all
practical purposes, its use of exclusive outlets forces the other firms
to use the same method of selling their goods.
Thus the basic structure of the antitrust laws has been modi-
fied. The Court no longer limits itself to cases involving monopoly
control of industry or horizontal price fixing. Instead, the Court
attempts to restrict and, where possible, to prevent the growth and
exploitation of the oligopolistic market structures which seem en-
demic to the American economy. For doing so, the Court has been
under continuous attack either for not articulating its policy, for
mistakenly attacking vertical integration, or for placing economic
theory above business reality. The Court has, however, moved in
the only way open to it to stop and, possibly, to reverse the trend
toward oligopoly. What the Court has not done is to articulate
clearly the reasons for its decisions. These decisions do have an
economic basis and carry out a beneficial policy.
This article, then, has articulated the economic basis, as well as
the beneficial policy, behind the Court's actions. It has shown
that the effect of the Court's decisions is to limit the ability of
putative and existing oligopoly firms to product differentiate recip-
rocally, to purchase or engage in economic warfare for the pur-
pose of excluding new entrants, or to raise the costs of remaining
in an industry. If this policy is fully effectuated, it should make
new entry easier, and thereby increase the real economic choices
of the consumer while limiting economic waste incurred through
the creation of product differentiation.
36 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
